This paper shows outside directors have a substantially increased chance of obtaining new positions (CEO, COB, directorships) during a CEO turnover year in firms that hire a CEO externally. These new positions are determined by outside directors' hiring source choice, not their performance; the opposite is true for inside directors. We find search firms are one channel by which outside directors can expect more new positions if their board hires externally, and that some inside directors have an incentive to support outside directors' effort to hire externally. Further, outside director representation on a board only predicts an external hire if at least one outside director gains a new position while hiring externally; otherwise, an inside hire is predicted. Firms having outside directors that gain new positions while hiring externally experience cash flow and stock return losses, relative to the performance potentially generated by promoting the available counterfactual internal candidate. Cash flow and stock return losses are not found when boards' outside directors hire CEOs externally but do not obtain new positions. We do not find support for alternative endogenous explanations of our results.
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Unintended Agency Conflicts for Outside Directors During CEO Selection
Hiring and firing CEOs, along with monitoring and advising, are the principal functions of corporate board members. Given the pivotal role that CEOs play in generating wealth, uncovering board member incentives that are perhaps unintentionally counter to the owners' during the hiring process may lead to better governance and potentially superior performance outcomes.
1 To date, research has focused on misalignment of inside directors' incentives during top executive turnovers. 2 In order to potentially uncover a new class of important incentives, we study outside directors' objectives during the CEO hiring process, since owners increasingly rely upon this group to further their interests (Linck, Netter and Yang (2009); Hermalin (2005) ).
We examine all CEO appointments at Forbes 800-size firms during the period when the rate of external hiring increased: the mid-1980s to 2005. 3,4 The focus is on boards that hire externally. Our definition of a situation in which a conflict may occur is motivated by experienced professionals' observations that a single director can often gain new positions (directorships) by steering their boards to involve executive search firms. These firms are incentivized to recommend an external CEO hire 5 and the search firm provide directors a direct connection to all the positions it is seeking to fill globally. That a single director can lead their board to make choices detrimental to owners is known. Hallock (1997) suggests that two CEOs acting as directors on the boards of each other's firms likely lead these boards to raise each other's pay. Further, we extend prior literature by showing that some inside directors have a material incentive to support outside directors in hiring externally. Therefore, we characterize a 2 board that hires a CEO externally as potentially conflicted if one or more of its outside directors secures new positions for themselves (as director, external CEO, or COB) during the year they participate in externally hiring a CEO. 6 Securing more and better positions during the hiring year for directors who hire a CEO externally is made more difficult as the firms they direct are often underperforming; their association with these weak firms would normally hinder their attempts to obtain new appointments (see, for instance, Yermack 2004 ). Yet we find that, contrary to expectations, hiring a CEO externally, rather than internally, is associated with outside directors who a) more opportunities are likely to accrue to outside directors; they dominate most boards.
To explore one of outside directors' means of networking during the CEO turnover year we obtain a unique sample of hiring firms that are known to employ a search firm. We find more than 80% of the time an external CEO hire is associated with hiring a search firm, which contrasts with the 28% average in our database and is consistent with search firms' incentives as 3 well as outside directors'. Outside directors who employ a search firm and hire a CEO externally are associated, all else equal, with a 400+% greater chance of obtaining new directorships at other firms, relative to outside directors who employ a search firm and promote internally.
Next, we investigate whether potential conflicts for outside directors are associated with a board's decision to hire a CEO externally. Our results show that the percentage of outside directors on a board with potential conflicts is positively associated with an outside CEO hire but is unrelated to these directors' or the firm's prior performance. Strikingly, for boards having no outside directors that show evidence of conflicting interests, the percentage of outside directors is positively associated with an internal CEO hire and the firm's prior performance.
New positions for outside directors who hire a CEO externally could result from an efficient labor market's demand for outside directors' expertise or endogenous selection of underperforming directors. Our tests (Section 6.5) do not show support for these explanations.
Thus, we next directly determine whether outside directors' potentially conflicts are associated with agency costs (cash flow losses) for shareholders after a board hires a CEO.
Our empirical methodology to measure agency costs incorporates the following features. 7 First, we capture an often neglected but critically important cash flow: all operating cash expenses due to changes in corporate strategies (discontinuing operations, restructuring, and layoffs). These expenses are usually associated with external hires; excluding them could bias our results. Second, we make the more appropriate comparison. Instead of comparing the performance of a sample of CEOs hired from inside to a sample of CEOs hired from outside the 4 firm, we compare the actual board choice (the one hired) to the counterfactual candidate that the board did not hire. Finally, our approach minimizes survival bias and selection bias, eliminates attempts by CEOs to manipulate their initial year(s) in office, and accounts for early divestiture of assets. Our approach follow that of Ang and Nagel (2014) who demonstrate that these features can materially impact empirical conclusions regarding CEO performance.
Using our methodology, we conduct empirical tests for evidence of agency costs when potential conflicts are observed for outside directors. We first consider the group of firms where at least one of a firm's outside directors quickly gains a job for themselves when the board hires a CEO externally. This group realizes a subsequent cash flow and stock return loss for shareholders. Potential incentive conflicts occur among independent director dominated boards that promote CEOs externally, and the potentially conflicted boards realize cash flow losses.
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Losses are also frequent among our sample's largest firms (similar to S&P 500 firms) when their external directors have potential conflicts and hire a CEO externally. Incentive conflicts are most evident when outside directors select one of their own to become CEO or COB; shareholders realize cash flow losses in this case. 9 We obtain further evidence confirming that these losses are indeed agency costs. When potential agency conflicts are absent, superior performance is realized. First, when we consider the group of external hire firms that shows no evidence of potential incentive conflicts, no cash 8 Outside directors are not employees of the firm, but they may have contractual links to the firm. Outside directors who have no contractual links to the firm are classified as independent directors. We show that boards with 75% or more outside directors are independent director dominated 81% of the time. Therefore, we call a board independent director dominated if 75% or more of the board is composed of outside directors. 9 Alternative efficient labor market explanations for the losses are investigated in Ang and Nagel (2014); these explanations are not supported by their tests; we replicate their tests on our database and reach identical conclusions. These alternative explanations are 1) boards hire externally to obtain a greater probability of superior performance, 2) outside CEOs restructure and leave the firm before improved performance is realized, 3) there is a known asymmetry of information between boards and outside hires, 4) there are systematic differences in incentive schemes for boards that promote from inside versus hire outside, and 5) firms that hire externally have an inadequate depth of talent.
5 flow or stock return losses are found. Second, no cash flow losses are found for external CEO hires by boards without potential conflict that are independent director dominated or are S&P 500-size firms. Third, since a distressed or near bankrupt firm allows no margin for agency concerns, we would expect their boards to make better hiring decisions. In this case, if the board is able to hire from a high quality firm, a gain is actually realized.
We contribute to the long line of literature on CEO turnover by calling attention to a class of agency issues that had not been studied in the Finance literature: the conflicting objectives of some outside directors in the external CEO hiring process. The paper proceeds as follows.
Section 1 discussed the hypotheses; 2 discusses the data; 3 investigates potential incentive conflicts; 4 describes our methods; 5 estimates agency costs; 6 addresses robustness and alternative explanations, Section 8 concludes.
Motivation, Hypothesis, and Predictions
Fama and Jensen (1983) urge researchers to focus on the "serious agency problems" involved in "searching for replacements for top managers." They realize that board directors, who are charged with CEO selection, can make their choice to benefit themselves at the expense of shareholders or, with proper incentives, choose to benefit owners. A potential advantage of networking is that desired positions may be obtained quickly.
Outside directors' incentives and means to obtain new positions during a CEO turnover
Demonstrating ability takes time. Yermack (2004) shows that outside directors are not likely to obtain new positions until they have demonstrated superior ability for approximately four years.
Thus, even outside directors with superior ability could choose to use networking to quickly obtain desired positions rather than wait.
Outside directors' potential agency conflicts during a CEO turnover
Outside directors can potentially increase their chances of obtaining positions they desire by engaging a search firm, or by using other common means of networking. We describe this possibility for search firms. The four largest U.S. search firms are paid a percentage (typically 7 30%) of a CEO's first full year cash pay. 12 All else equal, external CEO hires are paid 20% more than internal hires, and search firms usually obtain more search jobs at a firm after an external CEO placement than after an internal CEO placement. 13, 14 As a result, directors wishing to align with the search firm can advocate for an external CEO hire. 15
Agency hypothesis and predictions
The above discussion suggests that incentive conflicts can influence some outside directors to hire a new CEO externally to obtain private benefits from networking, to the detriment of owners. 16 Therefore, we seek to determine whether the outcomes predicted by agency theory for these potentially unintentional conflicts occur.
Additionally, the decision to appoint a CEO suitable for an unknown future is filled with uncertainty. Ideally, consistent guidance would be provided by academics and professionals to guide directors towards the expected best decision. However, academics (as well as professionals) provide divergent views. For instance, Shiller (2011) suggests that externally hired CEOs predominantly destroy owners' wealth, as does the current management literature; see Zhang and Rajagopalan (2010) for survey information. On the other hand, the finance literature has suggested externally hired CEOs create wealth; see, for instance, Huson, Malatesta and 12 Specific information on U.S. search firms' fees was obtained through private conversation with heads of executive recruiting for Fortune 500 firms and Doug Tatum, head of the Newport Board group. 13 See for instance Murphy and Zabojnik (2007) and Zhang and Rajagopalan (2010) . 14 External CEOs privately report they are aware their turnover rate is high, thus they seek to increase their value to search firms that can link them to future job opportunities; they also desire directorships. Increasing the search firm's value is often accomplished by contracting with the search firm to participate in filling the external CEO's junior executive positions. 15 To see this dynamic, consider the search firm's opinion of an outside director's ability after the director disputes the search firm's recommendation to hire externally. If the recommendation is rejected, the search firms will lose approximately 20% of revenues. Further, the outside director would appear unable to recognize talent that the search professional believes is the best. 16 We are aware of no data that allows a direct test of whether these potential agency conflicts cause single directors to use networking to obtain benefits for themselves at owners' expense by influencing their board to hire a CEO externally. Data on boards' nominating process for directors, but not CEOs, is disclosed starting in 2004. See http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8340.htm. Parrino (2004) ). Given the divergent guidance provided, directors may decide to enhance their careers by hiring externally when truly uncertain as to the impact of their hiring source decision.
Therefore, we have an:
Unintended agency conflict hypothesis: Outside directors' chance of obtaining new positions during the CEO turnover year depends on their CEO hiring source (internal or external), not their performance.
This hypothesis yields two empirically testable predictions. First, relative to outside directors of internal hire firms, outside directors of firms that hire a CEO externally realize personal benefits.
They have a greater probability of obtaining new position (external CEO, COB, directorships) by the end of the year of hire, and new positions for these outside directors are predicted by the CEO hiring source, not these directors' prior performance. This prediction applies to outside directors at both superior and underperforming firms. Second, the consequence for boards having outside directors with incentive conflicts that leads them to hire a CEO externally is an inferior choice. Therefore, we predict a cash flow loss for shareholders relative to what they would have gained from the internal CEO candidate.
Alternative hypothesis
The alternative to the agency hypothesis is that outside directors' incentives align with shareholders when selecting an external CEO. In this case, following Demsetz and Lehn (1985) , boards are guided by the goal of value maximization. Our alternative hypothesis follows: 
Cash flow measure
To assess the impact of directors' hiring source decision on firm value, we require a measure of cash flow that captures all the benefits and costs of that decision. These benefits and costs begin with the CEO's management of ongoing operations, where success is measured by operating income, which represents realized performance for the reporting period under the CEO. However, there are additional benefits and costs. Pan and Wang (2012) show that discontinuing operations, reorganizing, and laying off employees are strategies principally employed by externally hired CEOs. The cost of these strategies should be captured as they are conscious decisions made by the new CEOs and they immediately impact market value.
We now identify where the benefits and costs of external CEOs' strategies are recorded.
Compustat shows that once an operation is designated to be discontinued, all income from it is no longer included in operating income; instead, this income is reported under "special items"
(data17) and discontinued operations (data66). 18 Additionally, all costs for restructuring and onetime write-offs are reported under special items. Since these critical costs and benefits of the hiring decision are not included in the traditional measure of CEOs' cash flow, operating income, we turn to the accounting literature for a comprehensive measure of operating cash flow to more closely capture all the benefits and costs of the hiring decision.
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The accounting literature has suggested that cash flow from operations drives firm value; see the work of Thomas (1974) verified by Ward (1994) and Ward and Foster (1996) Pan and Wang (2012) show that CEOs focus restructuring efforts in the first year. Thus, eliminating CEOs with short tenure eliminates external hires culled by boards for poor performance and underreports costs of restructuring efforts that fail. Consequently, to minimize survival bias in our performance estimates, we include short tenure CEOs.
Outside Directors' Potential Incentive Conflicts
To study potential conflicts involving outside directors, we analyze firms that have at least one outside director on their board in the year before the CEO turnover. Firm performance prior to CEO turnover is investigated first, as we assume (following Fama (1980) ) the director/executive labor market uses this as one of the measures of an outside directors' ability.
We then quantify potential incentive conflicts for outside directors that involve new positions at other firms and at the firm where they participate in hiring the CEO; positions include director, CEO, COB, and officer. Probit analysis is used to investigate the extent to which directors' performance and hiring source decision determines these new positions. Search firm evidence is then investigated to understand whether networking for jobs could occur through search firms.
Finally, we investigate inside directors incentives to support a boards' effort to hire a CEO 20 We include the first, sometimes partial year performance because Weisbach (1995) argues incoming CEOs controls asset sales even before the new CEO is announced to the public, while Pourciau (1993) shows some control the books so as to "take a bath" in the appointment year at the prior CEO's expense in order to inflate future profits. 21 For this analysis we use the forced turnover data provided by Jenter and Kanaan (2014).
externally. These analyses motivate our subsequent investigation of agency costs. Table 2 shows firm performance before a CEO turnover event for boards with at least one outside director. Outside directors' firm performance before promoting a CEO internally is compared with outside directors' firm performance before externally hiring. As has been previously documented, boards that will hire a CEO externally have significantly (p-value < 0.01) underperformed by both accounting and market measures. 22 For instance, in the year before the CEO turnover, firms with outside directors that will hire a CEO externally underperform the stock performance of firms with outside directors that will promote a CEO internally by a median of 14.4 percentage points. Further, firms with outside directors that will hire externally have higher risk (p-value < 0.01).
Outside directors' performance before a CEO turnover
Insert Table 2 here.
Potential incentive conflicts: New positions for outside directors
The left hand side of Table 3 The right hand side of Table 3 , Panel A investigates COB positions obtained by outside directors. Outside directors are 207% more likely (p-value < 0.01) to obtain the COB position at their firm (the hiring firm) if they are involved in an external CEO hiring process, rather than an internal one. Nearly every one (97%) of the COB positions represents a personal gain (more income, promotion, prestige) for the outside directors who obtain them. Outside directors who become COB often add this position onto the duties they had before the CEO turnover. Table 3 , Panel B investigates new positions gained by outside directors at firms other than the firm at which they are involved in the CEO hiring process. First, compared to outside directors who promote internally, outside directors of a firm that hires externally are 72% more likely (p-value < 0.01) to leave that firm by the end of the CEO turnover year for a new position.
We note (on request) that these outside directors' departure rate is also 97% greater (p-value < 0.01) than that of outside directors of underperforming firms that promote a CEO internally, which suggests that outside directors on boards that hire a CEO externally choose to leave, rather than being forced out. We continue the investigation. Outside directors on a board that hires a CEO externally are 16.9% (p-value < 0.01) more likely to gain at least one new directorship by the end of the turnover year. They are also 67.2% more likely (p-value < 0.01) to obtain a new external CEO position at other firms and 17.6% (p-value < 0.01) more likely to gain positions of any type at other firms by the end of the turnover year.
The left hand side of Panel C investigates all of the new director and officer positions that outside directors gain by the end of the turnover year after serving on boards that hire a CEO externally versus internally. Those on boards that hire externally are 485% more likely (p-value < 0.01) to become an external CEO; this potential conflict is associated with 18% of boards that hire a CEO externally. 25 Outside directors who hire a CEO externally are also 28.2% more likely (p-value < 0.01) to obtain at least one new position of some type by the end of the year of hire.
The remainder of Panel C separately investigates external hire firms that outperform and those that underperform. 26 The middle of Panel C analyzes outside directors at outperforming firms: outside directors from firms that hire a CEO externally are 49.7% more likely (p-value < 0.01) to obtain at least one new position than outside directors from firms that promote a CEO internally. The right hand side of Panel C analyzes outside directors at underperforming firms:
outside directors from firms that hire a CEO externally are 23.4% more likely (p-value < 0.01) to obtain new positions than outside directors from firms that promote a CEO internally.
Insert Table 3 here.
Determinants of new positions for outside and inside directors
We now use multivariate probit analysis to understand whether the external CEO hiring decision is associated with new positions for outside directors after controlling for their performance. Table 4 shows this analysis; we use Yermack (2004) Insert Table 4 here.
Search firm evidence
The results thus far have focused on new positions obtained by outside directors. We now investigate a channel by which they might obtain these positions -search firms -by using a unique database of CEOs placed by search firms. We first investigate whether the employment of a search firm is associated with an increased probability that an outside director obtains new directorships at other firms, relative to using a search firm and promoting a CEO internally. Table 4 Column 5 provides the results. Its coefficient on the external CEO hire dummy (0.5071) is more than five times the coefficient on the external CEO hire dummy (0.0881) for the full sample. Untabulated results also show that the marginal effect of hiring a CEO externally on the probability of obtaining a new directorship is similarly increased by more than five times with the involvement of a search firm. If networking opportunities to gain directorships often motivate the use of search firms, few inside hires are likely to occur with the aid of search firms.
Consistent with this incentive the last row of Table 4 Column 5 shows that when search firms are employed, more than 80% of the hires are external; in contrast, the external hire rate in our raw sample is 28%, while among firms with sufficient data for our analysis it is 21.5% (See the last row of Column 2).
Directorship retention for inside directors
We now investigate who might support an outside director seeking to persuade a board to hire externally. We focus on inside directors, who Fama and Jensen (1983) suggest have severe agency problems when involved in top executive replacements. The literature has documented that inside directors are more likely to lose their jobs with an outside CEO (See Borokhovich, Parrino and Trapani (1996) for a summary of this research). Table 5 shows that insider directors who support an external CEO hire, rather than an internal promotion, enjoy a higher chance of staying on the board and this increased probability persists many years. Untabulated multivariate probit results confirm the conclusions drawn from the statistics shows in Table 5 . These results suggest that some inside directors seeking the economic benefits, power, and prestige associated with a board seat have an incentive to support an outside director seeking to hire an external CEO over an internal candidate.
Insert Table 5 here.
Summary
The above facts suggest that outside directors are more likely to personally benefit by rapidly gaining new positions (director, external CEO, COB, or officer) if they persuade the board to hire a CEO externally at their firm rather than promote an internal candidate. This finding applies to outside directors at both outperforming and underperforming firms that hire a 19 CEO externally. Additionally, the results are consistent with our prediction that new positions for outside directors involved in an external CEO hire are often gained by networking, not their performance. The opposite is true for inside directors; they must demonstrate performance to obtain new positions. Subsample analysis suggests that search firms enhance outside directors' ability to network for jobs during the turnover year -if their board hires a CEO externally.
Finally, we find that inside directors desiring to keep their seat on the board, have a greater chance of doing so if they support an external CEO hire. Thus, outside directors looking to network for jobs during the turnover year by hiring an external CEO can be aided by inside directors seeking to retain their board seats.
Method for Estimating the Performance Gain from a Board's Hiring Choice
The preceding discussion provides evidence that potentially conflicted outside directors have the incentive and means to obtain new positions for themselves by networking rather than performing for owners. We now investigate whether owner realize losses as a result of these conflicts. We follow the methods and determinants laid out in Ang and Nagel (2014). Their method uses the structural self-selection model (SSSM) of Li and Prabhala (2007) and Lee (1978) . The SSSM a) accounts for endogeneity issues caused by selection bias and b) completely accounts for the possibility that internal and external hires manage assets differently. Further, the SSSM enables the computation of the counterfactual performance that boards would have expected by hiring from the alternative source.
Using the structural self-selection modeling method we can calculate whether boards realize a gain from their hiring choice -for example, whether the realized performance (  Cfperf) from the external CEO choice exceeds the counterfactual performance that would have been obtained from the alternate choice not taken. We will call the result of this calculation the 20 gainx. The subscript on gainx, x, indicates either hiring source: E indicates the gain from hiring a CEO externally; and I from promoting a CEO internally.
Specification of exclusion variables in the structural self-selection model
Exclusion variables are required to identify our structural self-selection model; they determine the CEO hiring source but not firm performance. The theoretical foundation for our first exclusion variable is described in Ang and Nagel (2014) and is based on herding theory.
Theoretically, herding by boards in their CEO hiring decision a) determines the type of CEO selected, b) is unrelated to expected performance outcomes, and c) increases with the number of previous adopters.
Our remaining exclusion variables measure board characteristics, which could determine selection choice, since boards make the hiring decision. The variables chosen are based on the theory of Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) . Their theory maintains that board structure is endogenously determined by prior performance. Wintokia, Linck and Netter (2012) (WLN) show that board structure does not cause current year or future performance. Based on this theory, Gillan (2006) , and WLN's research, board structure variables are exclusion variables.
The first is the number of directors, which Yermack (1996) relates to board efficiency. The second is the percentage of outside directors on the board. Weisbach (1988) suggests the percentage of outside directors is a determinant of hiring source. The third variable is whether the departing CEO chairs the board in the year prior to hire. Our conclusions are the same if we use alternative measures of board structure and governance. 
Survival bias, truncation bias, and firm fixed effects
Survival and truncation bias could occur if internal or external hires' tenures are underrepresented and could also occur due to the database coverage. We primarily address these issues by averaging each profit measure (the principal measure used is the cash flow measure in equation (1)) over all years of a CEO's tenure. To remove time-invariant firm fixed effects, we use the difference-in-difference approach. To implement the approach, the profit measure, P, is computed as the average profit for a CEO over his tenure minus the profit in the year before he was hired (for example, see equation (2)). This difference is used in the computation of gainx to
give a difference-in-difference result. To mitigate endogeneity concerns with our independent variables, we measure each one in the year prior to hire; Section 6.4 addresses this endogeneity concern in greater depth.
Performance Gains with and without Directors' Potential Incentive Conflicts
This section uses the structural self-selection model of Section 4 to estimate the gainE realized by the external CEO hiring decisions of boards with potential conflicts and without.
Results from the structural self-selection model's probit selection model are discussed first. The probit analysis is followed by results from the structural model with a note on CEO performance measures. Henceforth, a negative gainx in a table will be referred to as a loss x . Finally, the probit selection models have high explanatory power; more than 77% of the selection choices are classified correctly. The exclusion variables are usually the strongest predictors of hiring type for boards both with and without potential conflicts.
Probit sample selection model
Insert Table 6 here. Column 1 shows no significant selection bias for external hires; this result is consistent throughout our analysis. The incentive conflicts we document for outside directors are consistent with and would predict this lack of selection bias.
Structural self-selection model estimates
The IMR coefficient in Column 2 also shows no selection bias for internal CEO hires.
We reason that internal CEOs are capable, on average, because inside directors need the firm to perform well to further their careers. Thus, inside directors work with the board out of their selfinterest to narrow the internal CEO candidate pool to just those capable of improving the firm.
However, their self-interest does not go so far as to narrow the selection to the best internal candidate, so the IMR is not significant.
The columns of Table 7 show the estimated performance regressions for internal and potentially conflicted external CEO hires. A comparison of the signs and significance of the coefficients for internal and external hires shows differences in how the two types of CEOs manage assets. First, most of the variables that significantly explain ∆Cfperf for internal hires are different from the variables that explain external hires' performance. For instance, age of the firm is significant for internal hires, not external hires. Further, among all the coefficients, including those for fixed effect, 12 coefficients are significantly different (typical p-value < 0.05) for internal and external hires, and 27 coefficient have different signs. 33 These results provide evidence that internal and external hire CEOs manage assets differently. Therefore, separate estimation equations for internal and external hire performances are required to capture differences in asset management ability.
Insert Table 7 here. shows that potentially conflicted independent director dominated boards realize an average (median) loss of 2.54 (0.76) percentage points in cash flow (p-value < 0.01). These results are economically important. Using our databases we calculate that the average cash flow return on assets for S&P 500 firms in our time period is 9.6%. Therefore, the loss E for potentially conflicted Forbes 800-size boards is 28.5% of the average cash flow for S&P 500 firms (i.e., 28.5%=100*2.74/9.6).
Performance gain for boards with versus without potential conflicts
Insert Table 8 here.
In Henceforth to focus on the likely results for external hire boards with no potential 34 Recall from Section 3 that potential conflicts for outside directors arise from a greater probability of obtaining the CEO or COB position(s) at their firm, or new positions at other firms, when they choose to hire a CEO externally.
conflicts, we present median performances and the percentage of external hire boards that realize a gainE. This approach avoids reporting results driven by rare but spectacular failures associated with external CEOs who take extraordinary risks. Insert Table 9 here. S&P 500-size firms in our sample (those with more than $2 billion in total assets the year before hire). Potentially conflicted S&P 500-size boards realize a loss of 1.51 percentage points (pvalue < 0.01) whereas S&P 500-size boards with no identified potential conflicts realize no significant loss on average and a median loss E of low significance (p-value < 0.10).
Potentially conflicted boards involved in bankruptcies, restructuring, and large firms
Validity of Exclusion Variables, Robustness, and Tests of Alternative Explanations
In this section the validity of the exclusion variables used in our structural self-selection model is empirically tested. We next investigate the robustness of our results to alternate measures such as operating income and yearly stock returns, and then reconcile with the prior literature. Lastly, we test alternate explanations for the new directorships obtained by outside directors on boards that hire external CEOs.
Validity of exclusion variables used in the structural self-selection model
Our structural self-selection model assumes that the four exclusion variables are valid; that is, they are uncorrelated to performance outcomes. To establish the validity of our exclusion variables, we apply a common empirical test used in labor economics (Booker, et al. (2011) . To run the test, the determinants of performance shown in Table 7 and the four exclusion variables shown in Table 6 are regressed on the dependent variable, performance, in the second stage of the Heckman procedure. The test interprets the exclusion variables as likely to be valid if they 35 The 74% for restructuring is derived from CEO hires by boards with a potential conflict divided by all restructuring hires: 78/(78+28).
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are not statistically significant determinants of performance in this regression. Care is required in the sample selected for this regression. Heckman (1979) points out that variables not belonging in the true structural equation for performance may appear to be statistically significant determinants of performance in regressions on subsamples. Therefore, we use the complete sample of all Forbes 800-size firms for the test. The results are shown in Table 10 , Panel A.
None of the exclusion variables is a significant determinant of performance, implying our exclusion variables are likely to be valid.
Insert Table 10 here.
To further establish whether the proper structural self-selection model is identified, we follow the tests of Leung and Yu (1996) . They show that identification depends upon whether the inverse Mills ratio (IMR) is correlated with the determinants of performance, X, in equations (8) and (9), not whether there is an exclusion variable. We find the IMR is not significantly correlated with these determinants, as Table 7 , Column 3 shows that its variance inflation factor is 1.82 when estimating cash flow performance for the internal CEO candidate. 
Alternative performance measures
Table 10, Panel B shows the robustness of our result to alternate performance measures for conflicted boards of Forbes 800-size firms. 37 For brevity, we do not present the results for boards with no identified potential conflicts; these boards consistently show no significant lossE.
The first row of the panel shows gainx using operating income return on assets. As was previously mentioned, operating income excludes many costs associated with strategies 36 A variation inflation factor greater than 10 indicates a collinearity concern. 37 We do not consider cash flows estimated from balance sheet accounts. In a seminal paper, Bahnson, Miller and Budge (1996) show that such estimates are "deficient and unreliable" for approximately 75% of firms in Compustat. Ward, Foster and Woodroof (2007) show that estimated cash flow does not predict financial distress; reported cash flow from operating activities on the cash flow statement does predict financial distress.
primarily used by externally hired CEOs, such as discontinuing operations. In line with this reasoning, Panel B, Row 1 shows the average loss E by conflicted external CEO hires (-0.012) and the gain I by internal hires (0.0105), though significant (p-value < 0.01), are about half the magnitude found (2.74 percentage points) when using a cash flow measure that completely captures the costs and benefits of boards' hiring source decision (see Table 8 , Row 1).
The cash flow measure used in Table 10 , Panel B, Row 2 (net income plus depreciation and amortization expense) is commonly used in Finance texts and is used by Kaplan and Zingales (1997) . This measure captures accruals but none of the costs of discontinued operations reported after tax. Therefore, we expect and find a reduction in the explanatory power of regressions that use this cash flow measure. Specifically, the adjusted R-squared value for external hires in Table 10 , Panel B, Row 2 is 0.406 versus the 0.620 value shown in the second column of Table 7 where performance is measured by our expanded cash flow measure (see equation (2)).
In Table 10 , Panel B, Row 3 we investigate whether the cash flow loss E of external CEOs hires appointed by potentially conflicted boards are reflected in these CEOs' yearly stock returns, relative to the counterfactual hires' stock returns. The results provide confirmation. On average, external CEOs hired by potentially conflicted boards realize a loss E of 7.01 percentage points in stock returns per year (p-value < 0.01) relative to the counterfactual stock returns of the internal CEO candidate.
Reconciliation with prior literature
We replicated the results of Huson, Malatesta and Parrino (2004) (available on request)
showing no loss due to external hiring using a similar sample (surviving Forbes 800-size firms) with a similar regression specification and their operating income measure. Using the same sample of surviving firm, our structural self-selection model also shows no loss E in operating income when hiring externally.
Robustness of performance results to using matching methods
Roberts and Whited (2012) recommend using matching methods to verify the robustness of results when endogeneity is a concern. We use the matching estimator of Abadie and Imbens (2006) to remove estimation bias, which they show increases with sample size when using alternative estimators such as propensity score matching. An advantage of using a matching method is that it mitigates endogeneity concerns if the matching variables are measured prior to the treatment (the hiring decision), which we do.
In Insert Table 11 here. This explanation is based on the theory of Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) and suggests director/officer selection is endogenous. In this theory, underperforming CEOs prefer pliant directors and so might preferentially select directors and officers from underperforming firms. In this case, underperforming outside directors who promote a CEO internally are expected to obtain new positions as frequently as outside directors who hire a CEO externally. Panel C provides no support for this expectation -outside directors from underperforming firms that promote a CEO internally are less likely (p-value < 0.01) to obtain new positions than outside directors from firms that hire externally.
Tests of alternative explanation of new directorships for outside director who hire externally
Conclusions
The evidence we present suggests that a portion of outside directors have incentive conflicts when they participate in the CEO hiring process. These conflicts involve their desire for 
 OIperf
The average of OIROA over CEO i's tenure minus OIROA in the year prior to CEO i's appointment. OIROA is operating income before depreciation/total assets = data13/data6.
 STKRETperf
The yearly stock return (STKRET) averaged over CEO i's tenure minus STKRET in the year prior to CEO i's appointment. The average excludes CEOs' first partial year to exclude exiting CEOs' returns and announcement returns for new CEOs.
Independent performance variables (usually measured in the year prior to hire) Total assets
Compustat item data6 in millions of dollars ($M). Average total assets (Total assets t + Total asets t-1 ) / 2; if Total asets t-1 is missing, Total assets t is used. CFROA Cash flow return on assets is CF / Average total assets. CF = Income before extraordinary items + Depreciation and amortization + Extraordinary items and discontinued operation + Deferred taxes + Equity in net loss (earnings) + Sale of property, plant, and equipment and sale of investments -Loss (gain) = data123+data125+data124+data126+data106+data213. See equation (1).
Market-to-book
The market value of Total assets/ Average total assets = (Total assets -Book equityDeferred taxes + Market value of equity)/Average total assets = (data6-data60-data74+data25*data199)/Average total assets. If Deferred taxes is missing, it is set to 0. Leverage Long term debt/Total assets = data9/data6. Std. Dev. Of stock returns (a.k.a. Risk)
The standard deviation of monthly stock return over the year prior to hire.
Firm age
The number of years the firm has been listed on CRSP in the year that the CEO is hired. Capital expenditure data128. If Capital expenditure is missing, it is set to 0. R&D data46. If R&D is missing, it is set to 0. Advertising data45. If Advertising is missing, it is set to 0. Pricing power Net income/Sales = data237/data12. Total asset turnover Sales/Total assets = data12/data6. Average CFROA t-1 to t-3
Average of CFROA over the three years prior to hire. ∆OIROA (over years -1 to -3) Change in operating income return on assets is OIROA in the year before hire minus OIROA three years before hire. OIROA is Operating income/Total assets = data13/data6. Excess return over the market return Percentage stock return of the firm over the year prior to the CEO hire less that year's value weighted percentage return for all stocks in CRSP. Forced turnover indicator If the departing CEO's age is less than 61 in the year of departure and the Shumway bankruptcy predictor variable (computed per Shumway 2001, p. 122 ) is in the two deciles of firms most likely to go bankrupt, the forced turnover indicator is set to 1; otherwise it is set to 0.
Exclusion variables (board structure variables measured in the year prior to hire and the herding measure) % Outside directors
Percentage of board seats held by directors who are not officers of the firm Number of directors
The number of directors on the board of directors Prior CEO chairs board Prior CEO chairs the board in the year prior to hire Herding measure
The percentage of externally hired CEOs over the three years prior to hire that are within the firm's Fama-French 49 industry; firms used to form this percentage are all smaller firms than Forbes 800-size firms (i.e., their total asset value < $350 million).
Other terms used
Outside director A director of a firm who is not listed as an officer of that firm by Compaq Disclosure Independent director dominated boards Using Risk Metrics' Investor Responsibility Research Center data and its definition of independent directors, we show that boards with 75% or more outside directors are independent director dominated 81% of the time. Thus, we call a board Independent director dominated if 75% or more of the board is composed of outside directors.
Table 1 Sample description
The sample in Panel A is drawn from CEO appointments at public U.S. firms from 1989 to 2005. CEOs appointed to Forbes 800-size firms is all appointments of CEOs whose type (internal CEO hire or external hire) is identified, whose firms have all the variables used in Table 7 , and have total assets > $350 million in the year prior to the CEO appointment. Internal CEO hires are CEOs who were an officer of the hiring firm for more than one year prior to their appointment, and any history as an officer at another public firm was two or more years prior to appointment. Once promoted to CEO, internal hires only have officer responsibilities at their firm. Officers are identified by using Compaq Disclosure's list of officers for all public firms or by using the Forbes 800 yearly list of CEOs starting in 1970. External CEO hires a) have a prior history as an officer at another public firm, b) have at most one year as an officer at the hiring firm, and c) after their first two years as CEO, only have officer responsibilities at that firm. Observed years of tenure is the observed number of years that a CEO serves at a firm. Firm age is defined in the Appendix. The sample in Panel B is the Boards of Forbes 800-size firms with at least one outside director where Compaq Disclosure provides the information needed to identify each of the firms' outside directors (defined in the Appendix). Identifying information is the last name, first initial, middle initial, and the director's age (if age is available). Risk Metrics' Investor Responsibility Research Center (abbreviated IRRC) data is provided for comparison to our Compaq Disclosure data for both Internal CEO hires and External CEO hires. We show the IRRC information that is available for Forbes 800-size firms after 1996 because the number of other board seats held (PROXYBSC) is often missing in 1996 and not available before 1996. Directors in the IRRC dataset are identified by their director id number; boards seats held is computed as PROXYBSC+1; and outside directors are those who are not identified as an employee by IRRC. In Panel C, we show the data used to identify incentive conflicts for outside directors of the hiring firms. Some observations in Compaq Disclosure are for directors and officers of private firms that subsequently become public. All monetary variables are in 2005 U.S. dollars.
Panel A: CEOs appointed to Forbes 800-size firms
Internal The sample is boards of Forbes 800-size firms with at least one outside director (described in Table 1 ). The types of hire (external CEO hire or internal CEO hire) are defined in Table 1 . Average CFROA t-1 to t-3 is the average of CFROA over the three years prior to CEO i's appointment. CFROA is defined in the Appendix and in equation (1). CFROA t-1 is the CFROA in the year prior to CEO i's appointment. Std. dev. Of stock returns t-1 is the standard deviation of monthly stock return over the year prior to the CEO hire. ∆OIROA (over years -1 to -3) is the change in operating income return on total assets (OIROA) in the year before hire minus OIROA three years before hire; this variable is further defined in the Appendix. Excess return over the market return is the percentage stock return of the firm over the year prior to the CEO hire less that year's value weighted percentage return for all stocks in CRSP. The t-test (signed rank test) is used to detect a significant difference in the average (median) value of a variable for internal and external hires. * p-value < 0.1, ** p-value < 0.05; *** p-value < 0.01. 
Source of hire
Mean
-0.0160 *** -0.0240 *** 0.0223 *** -0.0086 -11.52 *** Median -0.0156 *** -0.0188 *** 0.0194 *** -0.0095 *** -14.40 *** Table 3 New positions (director, CEO, or COB) gained by outside directors by the end of the their firm's CEO turnover year
The sample is outside directors on boards of Forbes 800-size firms with at least one outside director (described in Table 1 ). The types of hire (External CEO hire or Internal CEO hire) are defined in Table 1 . OD stands for outside director, which includes any director of a firm who is not listed as an officer of that firm by Compaq Disclosure. The end of the year just before hire is indicated by t-1; the end of the year of hire is indicated by t 0 . New directorships are obtained by the end of the year of hire. New positions are not counted at other firms if the OD is an officer or director there in the year prior to hire. In Panel A, an OD's personal gain is indicated by: leaving a junior officer position at the OD's prior firm to become the externally hired CEO, an inactive CEO who becomes the firm's externally hired CEO (the hiring firm is an average of 30% larger that this CEO's prior firm), an active CEO who becomes the firm's externally hired CEO (this hiring firm is an average of 70% larger), a COB position is added to the ODs' current duties, or the COB position is obtained in addition to becoming CEO of the firm. In Panel C, # of ODs who become external CEO by t 0 is the number of ODs who become external CEOs at any public firm. Underperformance is said to occur if ∆OIROA (over years -1 to -3) (see Appendix) is less than the median for firms with ODs, or if excess return over the market return (see Appendix) is less than the median for firms with ODs. Outperformance is said to occur if the firm has not had underperformance. The proportions test (Kruskal-Wallis test) is used to detect a significant difference in the percentage value (median) of a variable for internal and external hires. * p-value < 0.1, ** p-value < 0.05; *** pvalue < 0.01. ^ In 18 of 59 instances where the hiring firm's ODs become COB, data to determine personal gain is not available.
Panel A: New CEO and COB positions obtained at the hiring firm by outside directors involved in that firm's CEO hire
One of the hiring firm's ODs becomes the external CEO Hiring firm's OD becomes COB Table 4 Determinants of new positions for outside and inside directors during the CEO turnover year Outside directors are defined in Table 1 ; Inside directors are defined to be directors who are also officers of the firm. The samples of outside directors include all who are on boards of Forbes 800-size firms with at least one outside director (described in Table 1 ). The outside director sample in Columns 1 and 2 is the same as the sample in Table 3 , Panels B and C; the samples in Columns 4 and 5 are subsets of this sample. The inside director sample in Column 3 is the inside directors on the boards of the firms in the sample for Columns 1 and 2. The end of the year prior to the CEO hire is indicated by t-1; the end of the year of hire is indicated by t 0 . New positions are only counted if they are obtained during the CEO turnover year and are obtained by the end of the year of hire. New positions are not counted at other firms if the OD is an officer or director there in the year prior to hire. External CEO hire is defined in Table 1 ; this variable is set to 1 if the CEO is hired externally; 0 otherwise. Board counter is the number of boards seats held by each director. Excess return over the market return is defined in the Appendix. Industry fixed effect are included for industries having at least 5 CEO turnovers. * p-value < 0.1, ** p-value < 0.05; *** p-value < 0.01. Table 5 Inside directors' retention of directorships on the hiring firm's board
The sample for inside directors of Forbes 800-size firms (described in Table 1 ) excludes mergers and is inside directors at firms having at least one inside director at the year before the CEO turns over: t-1. Inside directors are defined as directors of the firm who are also officers of the firm. Number of inside directors t-1 is the number of inside directors at t-1. The time 't0' indicates the end of the CEO turnover year. The variable, % staying at the firm t0 , is the % of inside directors who were officers of the firm at t-1 and who are still officers of the firm at the end (t0) of the CEO turnover year. The variable, % staying on the board t0 , is the % of inside directors at t-1 who are still directors of the firm at the end (t0) of the CEO turnover year. The signed rank test is used to detect a significant difference in the median value of a variable for internal and external hires. * p-value < 0.1, ** p-value < 0.05; *** p-value < 0.01. ^ The percent staying on the board (84.7) is greater than the % staying at the firm (84.6) because some inside directors are no longer employees but retain their board seat.
Retention of positions through the end of the CEO turnover year Table 6 Probit sample selection model for choice of hiring source by boards with and without potential conflicts
The sample is Forbes 800-size firms. These firms, internal CEO hires and external CEO hires are defined in Table 1 . The probit sample selection model is estimated as described by Heckman (1979) . An external hire board is defined to have an identified potential conflict if one of its outside directors obtains a new position by the end of the CEO turnover year; new positions are obtained with greater probability if boards hire externally; see Section s 3.3 and 3.4 and Tables 3 and 4. The dependent variable for the probit selection model is 1 if an external hire is appointed, 0 otherwise. All independent variables are measured in the year prior to hire (i.e., t-1) or over the three years prior to hire (i.e., t-1 to t-3), as defined in the Appendix. Marginal effect is the average effect on the probability of hiring externally per unit change of the variable (as computed by SAS) times one standard deviation of the variable. For the indicator variables (Forced turnover and Prior CEO chairs the board), the marginal effect equals the average marginal effect. * p-value < 0.1, ** p-value < 0.05; *** p-value < 0.01. External CEO hires with an identified potential conflict and internal CEO hires are drawn from the Forbes 800-size firms defined in Table 1 . An external hire board is defined to have an identified potential conflict if one of its outside directors obtains a new position (primarily directorships) by the end of the CEO turnover year; new positions are obtained with greater probability if boards hire externally; these conflicts are discussed in Sections 3.2 and 3.3 and are analyzed in Tables 3 and 4 . The dependent variable is Cash flow performance (  CFperf). Selection bias is accounted for by the Inverse Mills ratio (computed from the sample selection model in Table 6 as specified by Heckman (1979) ). All variables are defined in the Appendix. Standard errors are corrected for firm level clustering (Petersen (2009) The samples are drawn from the Forbes 800-size firms. Forbes 800-size firms are defined in Table 1 , as are internal and external CEO hires. An external hire board is defined to have an identified potential conflict if one of its outside directors obtains a new position (primarily directorships) by the end of the CEO turnover year; new positions are obtained with greater probability if boards hire externally; these conflicts are discussed in Sections 3.2 and 3.3 analyzed in Tables 3 and 4 . The structural self-selection model solved in Table 7 and discussed in Section 4 is used to estimate gainx in cash flow performance. Subscript x indicates hiring source: E indicates external hire, I indicates internal hire. For computing gainx, cash flow performance (  CFperf) is defined in the Appendix and in equation (2). Selection bias is accounted for by the inverse Mills ratio (see equations (9) and (10) in Ang and Nagel (2014)). The gainE for an externally hired CEO is the actual performance (  CFperf) of the external CEO minus the counterfactual performance of the internal CEO candidate (i.e., the expected performance of an internal hire given that an outsider was hired); see equation (11) in Ang and Nagel (2014). The "gainI" for an internal hired CEO is the actual performance of the internal hired CEO minus the counterfactual performance of the external CEO candidate (i.e., the expected performance of an external CEO hire given that an insider was hired); see equation (12) in Ang and Nagel (2014) . Gainsx are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels within each type of CEO hire. Average and Median gainsx significantly different from zero are determined using the t-statistic (signed rank test). In Panel C the proportions test is used to establish significance. The t-statistic for significance is given in parentheses. * p-value < 0.1, ** p-value < 0.05; *** p-value < 0.01. NA means there was either not enough data to compute the counterfactual external hire performance or that the regression for computing this performance was unreliable (adjusted Rsquared was negative). Table 9 Outside directors' incentive conflicts versus external CEO cash flow performance in bankruptcies, forced turnovers, restructuring a firm, and at S&P 500-size firms
The samples are drawn from the Forbes 800-size firms. Forbes 800-size firms are defined in Table 1 , as are internal and external CEO hires. The structural self-selection model discussed in Table 7 is used to estimate the gainE in cash flow performance for the samples listed (subscript E indicates external). The gainE for an externally hired CEO is defined in Table 8 . GainsE are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. Sample sizes not given in brackets are the number of externally hired CEOs in the sample; below each of these sample sizes the bracketed sample size is the number of internally promoted CEOs used to estimate the counterfactual performances that the internal CEO hires would have delivered given that an external CEO was actually hired. In Panel B, an external hire board is defined to have an identified potential conflict if one of its outside directors obtains a new position (primarily directorships) by the end of the CEO turnover year; new positions are obtained with greater probability if boards hire externally; these conflicts are discussed in Sections 3.2 and 3.3 and analyzed in Tables 3 and 4. In Rows 1 and 2 of Panel B, the counterfactual internal CEO performance is estimated using all internal hire CEOs. In Row 3, the counterfactual is estimated using the 368 internal CEO appointed who restructure their firm. In Row 4, the counterfactual is estimated using the 669 internally promoted CEOs at S&P 500-size firms. Firms not likely to go bankrupt are in the 80% of firms least likely to experience bankruptcy, as defined by the Shumway bankruptcy predictor variable (Shumway (2001) . Firms likely to go bankrupt are the remaining 20% of firms (those most likely to go bankrupt). Top firms have a CFROA (see equation (1)) greater than the median of all Forbes 800-size firms. Forced turnovers are identified using the algorithm of Parrino (1997) . Firms that restructure have a dollar value of restructuring during the CEO's tenure that exceeds 25% of the value of Total assets (Computstat item data6) the year before the CEO is hired. The dollar value of restructuring is computed over a CEO's tenure as the sum of 1) the market value of a firm that is sold, 2) the market value of assets sold off, 3) the market value of firms acquired by the CEO, and 4) the market value of firms spun off by the CEO. S&P 500-size firms have at least $2 billion in total assets in the year prior to hire. Average gains E significantly different from zero are determined using the t-statistic. Median gains E significantly different from 0 are determined by the signed rank test; the same test established significance for % who realize a gain. * p-value < 0.1, ** p-value < 0.05; *** p-value < 0.01. Table 10 Tests of the validity of the structural self-selection model and robustness of losses from external CEO hiring by conflicted boards
The sample for Panel A, Forbes 800-size firms, is defined in Table 1 , as are internal hires and external hires.  CFperf is defined in equation (2). Gainsx for internal and externally hired CEOs are defined in Table 8 . Subscript x indicates hiring source: E indicates external hire, I indicates internal hire. Gainsx are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels within each type of hire. Boards with identified potential conflict of interest are defined in Table 8 . The performance measures used in Panel B, Rows 1 to 3, are defined just like  CFperf is in equation (2), except that the listed performance measure is used in place of cash flow.
For instance, in Row 1 of Panel B operating income return on assets is used instead of cash flow return on assets (CFROA) in equation (2) to give  OIperf. In Row 3 of Panel B the yearly stock return (STKRET) during the CEO's tenure is used in equation (2) to give  STKRETperf; the year that overlaps the prior CEO and the year that overlaps the subsequent CEO are excluded. All variables are defined in the Appendix. Average gainsx significantly different from zero are determined using the t-statistic, which is given in parenthesis. Medians gainsx significantly different from zero are determined using the signed rank test. * pvalue < 0.1, ** p-value < 0.05; *** p-value < 0.01. Table 11 Robustness to the method of estimating performance gains from potentially conflicted boards' external CEO hiring
The sample of internal CEO hires and external CEO hires made by boards with identified conflicts is the same as in Table 8 , Panel A, Row 1. Internal CEO hires and External CEO hires are defined in Table 1 . An external hire board is defined to have an identified potential conflict if one of its outside directors obtains a new position (primarily directorships) by the end of the CEO turnover year; new positions are obtained with greater probability if boards hire externally; these conflicts are discussed in Sections 3.2 and 3.3 and analyzed in Tables 3 and 4 . This table reports treatment effects. The gainx due to treatment for firms with potentially conflicted boards that hire a CEO externally equals the cash flow performance,  CFperf, realized by hiring externally minus the cash flow performance of internal hire(s) at matched firm(s). In a similar manner, the gainx due to treatment for firms with boards that hire a CEO internally equals the performance realized by promoting a CEO internally minus the performance of potentially conflicted external hire(s) at matched firm(s). Cash flow performance,  CFperf, is defined in the Appendix and in equation (2). Matching of firms is accomplished using the matching estimator of Abadie and Imbens (2006) with replacement. We account for bias as recommended by Abadie and Imbens (2004) . The variables used in matching are the same variables used in the probit model of Table 6 . In Panel A, t-statistics are reported in parentheses. * p-value < 0.1, ** p-value < 0.05; *** p-value < 0.01. The samples in Panels A, B, and C are drawn from Forbes 800-size firms; these firms and the types of hire (External CEO hire or Internal CEO hire) are defined in Table 1 . OD stands for outside director. An external hire board is defined to have an identified potential conflict if one of its ODs obtains a new position (primarily directorships) by the end of the CEO turnover year; new positions are obtained with greater probability if boards hire externally; these conflicts are discussed in Sections 3.2 and 3.4 and analyzed in Tables 3 and 4 . Panels A and B investigate ODs' contribution at their new positions; these new positions (primarily directorship) are analyzed in Table 3 . CFROA and Excess return over the market return are defined in the Appendix. Risk is the standard deviation of monthly stock returns in the year prior to hire.  CFROA = CFROA averaged over the first three full years of an OD's new directorship less the CFROA at that firm the year prior to the directorship appointment year;
 excess return and  risk are similarly defined; both excess return and risk are measured as % per year. The yearly excess return = 12 * average monthly excess return. Risk variance is additive assuming independence, so yearly risk = square root (12*the square of the monthly standard deviation of stock returns). An internal hire firm underperforms if a) ∆OIROA (over years -1 to -3) is less than the median for firms with outside directors (ODs) or if excess return over the market return is less than the median for firms with ODs, and b) one or more of the firm's officers leaves to become an external CEO at another firm in the two years prior to the CEO turnover; the measures used in this definition are defined in the Appendix. All remaining terms are defined in the Appendix. The t-test is used to detect a significant difference across groups in the average value of a variable; the signed rank test is used for significant differences in medians. In Panel C the proportions test is used to establish significance. * p-value < 0.1, ** p-value < 0.05; *** p-value < 0.01. 
